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Abstract: Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We deter-
mine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees
stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is
maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak)
responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when
we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with
various properties of the set of stable matchings for “responsive couples markets,” viz., optimal-
ity, filled positions, and manipulation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers:
C78; J41.
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Running title: Stable Matchings with Couples
1 Introduction
Labor markets are in a continuous process of change. The growing number of couples with the
same professional interests is part of this process. Couples seeking positions in the same labor
market form a growing part of the demand side. However, they increase the complexity of the
matching problem considerably since now, in addition to finding a mutually agreeable solution
for both sides of the labor market, one also has to deal with group decision making on the
demand side.
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In addition to individual job quality, couples’ preferences may capture certain “complemen-
tarities” that are induced by the distance between jobs. Loosely speaking, by complementarities
we mean that the valuation of one partners job may crucially depend on the other partner’s
job, that is, the couple may consider job a to be a good job for the husband while the wife
holds job b, but unacceptable if the wife holds job c. As in many other economic environments
(e.g., multi-object auctions or efficient resource allocation with indivisibilities) the presence of
complementarities, or in other words the absence of sufficient substitutability, may imply that
“desirable” economic outcomes (e.g., Nash or general equilibria) fail to exist.
In many centralized labor markets, clearinghouses are most often successful if they produce
stable matchings.1 In order to explain stability, let us assume for the moment that one side
of the market consists only of single workers, and the other side consists of firms each with
one position. A matching is then a partition of all workers and firms into pairs (one worker
is matched to one firm) and unmatched workers and/or firms. Such a matching is “stable”
if (a) each firm and worker has an acceptable match, and (b) no firm and no worker prefer
one another to their respective matches. For matching markets with sufficient substitutability
instabilities can be ruled out.2 For one-to-one matching markets considered in this article,
Roth (1984) demonstrates the possibility of instability in the presence of couples. In his example,
the couples’ preferences over pairs of positions (one position for each member of the couple) seem
to be somewhat arbitrary (see Table 1). In this article we give some more intuitive examples of
instability and aim to obtain a better understanding of what happens when instabilities occur.
First, we show that for a natural preference domain for couples, namely the domain of
“(weakly) responsive” preferences, stable matchings exist (Theorem 3.3). A couple’s preferences
are responsive if the unilateral improvement of one partner’s job is considered beneficial for
the couple as well. If responsiveness only applies to acceptable positions, then preferences are
weakly responsive. Hence, (weakly) responsive preferences may reflect situations where couples
search for jobs in the same metropolitan area (if one partner switches to a job he/she prefers and
the couple can still live together, then the couple is better off). Since responsiveness essentially
excludes complementarities in couples’ preferences that may for instance be caused by distance
considerations, this result – to some extent – may seem trivial. However, it mirrors other results
showing that a sufficient amount of substitutability implies the existence of desirable outcomes
for the markets in question (see for instance Roth (1985, many-to-one matching without money),
Kelso and Crawford (1982, many-to-one matching with money), Alkan and Gale (2003, many-to-
many schedule matching), and Hatfield and Milgrom (2004, two-sided matching with contracts).
In contrast to our article, the substitutability conditions in those papers3 apply to preferences
on the supply side (hospitals or firms) over sets of agents (students or workers), while our
responsiveness condition applies to preferences on the demand side (couples of students) over
ordered pairs of hospitals (not sets!). We show that under a restricted unemployment aversion
condition, the domain of weakly responsive preferences is maximal for the existence of stable
1Empirical evidence is given in Roth (1984, 1990, 1991) and Roth and Xing (1994).
2For one-to-one and many-to-one matching markets without money see Gale and Shapley (1962) and
Roth (1985), for many-to-one matching markets with money see Kelso and Crawford (1982), for many-to-one
matching with affirmative action constraints see Abdulkadirog˘lu (2003), for many-to-many schedule matching see
Alkan and Gale (2003), and for two-sided matching with contracts see Hatfield and Milgrom (2004). This list is
not exhaustive.
3For instance, Alkan and Gale’s (2003) “persistence” condition and Hatfield and Milgrom’s (2004) “sub-
stitution” condition both encompass Roth’s (1985) “responsiveness” and Kelso and Crawford’s (1982) “gross
substitutes” condition on preferences of hospitals/firms over sets of students/workers and corresponding wages.
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matchings (Theorem 3.5). This implies that for strictly unemployment averse couples the domain
of responsive preferences where all positions are considered to be acceptable is a maximal domain
for the existence of stable matchings (Corollary 3.6).
Next, we analyze the existence of stable matchings for couples markets without any un-
employment aversion condition. Then, proceeding from our possibility result for responsive
preferences, we show that the absence of stable matchings in couples markets is not a theoreti-
cal irregularity: a single couple may cause a labor market to be unstable even if its preference list
is very consistently based on their individual preferences and the desire to not live too far away
from each other. In one of our examples we demonstrate that even a small deviation from re-
sponsiveness can cause instability (Example 3.8). Our nonexistence result persists even when we
relax the requirement of stability and use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic block-
ing (Theorem 3.7). By means of another instructive example (Example 3.9) we demonstrate
how couples that do not want to be separated cause instability.
We base our remaining analysis of the set of stable matchings for couples markets on the
fact that for responsive preferences one can construct a unique associated singles market with a
nonempty set of stable matchings that is included in the set of stable matchings of the original
couples market. This might lead one to conclude that, apart from the existence of stable match-
ings, other desirable properties of stable matchings for singles markets (not generally transferred
to general couples markets) would carry over to couples markets with responsive preferences as
well. Unfortunately this is not the case. First, we demonstrate that even for the domain of
responsive preferences the set of stable matchings no longer needs to be a distributive lattice
(Theorem 4.2). More precisely, we strengthen results due to Aldershof and Carducci (1996)
by showing that for couples markets with responsive preferences there may be no optimal sta-
ble matching for either side of the market. Furthermore, we demonstrate that different stable
matchings may assign positions to different applicants and/or have a different number of posi-
tions filled (Theorem 4.3). Finally, we show that for the domain of responsive preferences there
exists no strategy-proof stable-matching mechanism based on revealed preferences. More pre-
cisely, we show that there is no stable-matching mechanism for which stating the true preferences
is a dominant strategy for every couple (Theorem 4.5).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a simple couples market
where the labor market modelled consists of a supply side of four hospitals and a demand
side of two couples composed of medical students. In Section 3 we establish the existence
of stable matchings for weakly responsive preferences and demonstrate that under restricted
strict unemployment aversion the domain of weakly responsive preferences is maximal for the
existence of stable matchings. We also demonstrate with two examples how small deviations
from (weak) responsiveness that incorporate the distance considerations of a couple may lead
to instability. In Section 4 we show that both the lattice structure and the invariable group of
matched agents of the set of stable matchings need not carry over from singles markets to couples
markets with responsive preferences. Finally, still assuming preferences to be responsive, we show
that any stable-matching mechanism is prone to manipulation by couples misrepresenting their
preferences. We conclude with Section 5, where we discuss the relation of our results for couples
markets to those of Hatfield and Milgrom (2004) for matching markets with contracts.
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2 Matching with Couples: The Model
For convenience and without loss of generality, we describe a simple couples market where
the labor market modelled consists of a supply side of four hospitals and a demand side of
two couples composed of medical students; H = {h1, h2, h3, h4}, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, and C =
{c1, c2} = {(s1, s2), (s3, s4)} are the sets of hospitals, students, and couples, respectively. Each
hospital has exactly one position to be filled. All of our results can easily be adapted to more
general situations that include other couples as well as single agents and hospitals with multiple
positions.4 Next, we describe preferences of hospitals, students, and couples.
Hospitals’ preferences: Each hospital h ∈ H has a strict, transitive, and complete preference
relation h over the set of students S and the prospect of having its position unfilled, denoted by
∅. Hospital h’s preferences can be represented by a strict ordering of the elements in S∪{∅}; for
instance, P (h) = s4, s2, ∅, s1, s3 indicates that hospital h prefers student s4 to s2, and considers
students s1 and s3 to be unacceptable. In the remainder of the paper each hospital typically
prefers its position filled by some student rather than unfilled. Let PH = {P (h)}h∈H .
Students’ preferences: Similarly, each student s ∈ S has an individual strict, transitive, and
complete preference relation s over the set of hospitals and the prospect of being unemployed,
denoted by u. Let h ∈ H. If h s u, then hospital h is acceptable to student s; if u s h,
then hospital h is unacceptable to student s. We assume that these individual preferences are
the preferences a student has if he/she is single. Student s’s individual preferences can be
represented by a strict ordering of the elements in H ∪ {u}; for instance, P (s) = h1, h2, h3, h4, u
indicates that student s prefers hi to hi+1 for i = 1, 2, 3 and prefers being employed to being
unemployed. Let PS = {P (s)}s∈S .
Couples’ preferences: Finally, each couple c ∈ C has a strict, transitive, and complete
preference relation c over all possible combination of ordered pairs of (different) hospitals and
the prospect of being unemployed. Couple c’s preferences can be represented by a strict ordering
of the elements in H := [(H∪{u})×(H∪{u})]\{(h, h) : h ∈ H}. To simplify notation, we denote
a generic element of H by (hp, hq), where hp and hq indicate a hospital or being unemployed.
For instance, P (c) = (h4, h2), (h3, h4), (h4, u), etc., indicates that couple c = (s1, s2) prefers s1
and s2 being matched to h4 and h2, respectively, to being matched to h3 and h4, respectively,
and so on. Let PC = {P (c)}c∈C .
Note that when presenting preferences in examples, we often use column notation. Furthermore,
whenever we use the strict part  of a preference relation, we assume that we compare different
elements in S ∪ {∅}, H ∪ {u}, or H.
We use the following restrictions on the couples’ preferences in the remainder of the paper.
Unemployment aversion: A couple c is strongly unemployment averse if it prefers full em-
ployment to the employment of only one partner and the employment of only one partner to the
unemployment of both partners. Formally, for all hp, hq, hr 6= u, (hp, hq)c(hr, u)c(u, u) and
(hp, hq)c(u, hr) c(u, u).
A couple c is strictly unemployment averse if it is worse off if one of its partners looses his/her
position. Formally, for all hp, hq 6= u, (hp, hq)c(hp, u)c(u, u) and (hp, hq)c(u, hq)c(u, u).
Note that strong unemployment aversion implies strict unemployment aversion.
4To be more precise, in order to straightforwardly derive all results for the case of hospitals with multiple
positions, we would require that hospitals’ preferences are “responsive over sets of students” (see Roth (1985) and
Section 5).
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Responsive preferences:5 Note that a priori we do not require any relation between students’
individual preferences and couples’ preferences. In fact, we cannot or do not always wish to
specify individual preferences when couples are concerned. However, we do study some situations
in which there is a clear relationship. This is the case when the unilateral improvement of one
partner’s job is considered beneficial for the couple as well. Couple c = (sk, sl) has responsive
preferences if there exist preferences sk and sl such that for all hp, hq, hr ∈ H ∪{u}, [hpskhr
implies (hp, hq)c(hr, hq)] and [hpslhr implies (hq, hp)c(hq, hr)]. If these associated individual
preferences sk and sl exist, then they are unique.6 Note that if a couple (sk, sl) has responsive
preferences, then one can easily derive the associated individual preferences sk and sl (see
for instance Klaus et al. (2003), Example 2.1).
Leader-follower responsive preferences: A couple c = (sk, sl) has leader-follower responsive
preferences if it has responsive preferences and in addition gives precedence to the job quality
for one of its members first (without loss of generality we assume that sk is the leader and sl
the follower), i.e., for all hp, hx, hq, hy ∈ H ∪ {u}, (hp, hx)c(hq, hy) implies (hp, h′x)c(hq, h′y)
for all h′x, h′y ∈ H ∪ {u}.
Singles and couples markets: Now, the standard one-to-one two-sided matching market with
single students, or singles market for short, is denoted by (PH , PS). Since singles markets and
some of the classical results for singles markets are well-known, for a detailed description we
refer to Roth and Sotomayor (1990) who give an excellent introduction to this model and review
all results that are relevant here. For instance, the set of stable matchings is nonempty and
coincides with the core. A one-to-one matching market with couples, or a couples market for
short, is denoted by (PH , PC).7
Matchings: A matching µ for a couples market (PH , PC) is an assignment of students and
hospitals such that each student is assigned to at most one hospital in H or to u (which can
be assigned to multiple students), each hospital in H is assigned to at most one student or to
∅ (which can be assigned to multiple hospitals), and a student is assigned to a hospital if and
only if the hospital is assigned to the student.
By µ(S) = µ(s1), µ(s2), µ(s3), µ(s4) we denote the hospital in H or u matched to students
s1, s2, s3, s4. Thus, sk is matched to µ(sk). Alternatively, by µ(H) = µ(h1), µ(h2), µ(h3), µ(h4)
we denote the students in S or ∅ matched to hospitals h1, h2, h3, h4. Note that the matching
µ associated to (PH , PC) can be completely described either by µ(S) or by µ(H), but both
notations will be useful later.8
5The concept of responsive preferences was first introduced in Roth (1985), but differs from ours as it deals
with hospitals having preferences over (unordered) sets of students.
6Note that these derived preferences sk and sl need not coincide with the students’ individual preferences.
However, in order to keep notation as simple as possible, we denote the derived preferences the same way as we
denote students’ individual preferences.
7Instead of denoting a couples market by (PH , PC), we could add students’ individual preferences and consider
(PH , PS , PC). Since we do not explicitly use the students’ individual preferences, we suppress them in our
notation.
8In our model with two couples and four hospitals we have 209 different matchings: 24 =
(
4
4
)2 · 4! matchings
with full employment, 96 =
(
4
3
)2 · 3! matchings with one unemployed student, 72 = (4
2
)2 · 2! matchings with two
unemployed students, 16 =
(
4
1
)2 ·1! matchings with three unemployed students, and 1 = (4
0
)2 ·0! full unemployment
matching.
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Stability: Finally, we define stability for couples markets (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990)).
First, for a matching to be stable, it should always be better for students (one or both members
in a couple) to accept the position(s) offered by the matching instead of voluntarily choosing
unemployment and for hospitals it should always be better to accept the student assigned by
the matching instead of leaving the position unfilled. A matching µ is individually rational if
(i1) for all c = (sk, sl), (µ(sk), µ(sl))c(µ(sk), u), (µ(sk), µ(sl))c(u, µ(sl)),
and (µ(sk), µ(sl))c(u, u);
(i2) for all h ∈ H, µ(h)h∅.
Second, if one partner in a couple can improve the given matching for the couple by switching to
another hospital such that this hospital is better off as well, then we would expect this mutually
beneficial trade to be carried out, rendering the given matching unstable. A similar statement
holds if both students in the couple can improve. For a given matching µ, (c = (sk, sl), (hp, hq))
is a blocking coalition if
(b1) (hp, hq)c(µ(sk), µ(sl));
(b2) [hp ∈ H implies skhp µ(hp)] and [hq ∈ H implies slhq µ(hq)].
A matching is stable if it is individually rational and if there are no blocking coalitions.9
Instability in a couples market: Roth (1984, Theorem 10) shows that stable matchings
may not exist in the presence of couples. He considers the couples market (PH , PC) given by
Table 1.10 We use the following convention for this and future examples. If ∅ is not listed for
hospitals, then all students are acceptable.
By giving a blocking coalition for each of the 24 individually rational full employment match-
ings, Roth shows that no stable matching exists. Note that neither couple’s preferences are
responsive. (For couple c1 = (s1, s2) this follows for instance from (h1, h4)c1(h1, h3) and
(h2, h3)c1(h2, h4).)
In the next section, departing from Roth’s example, we address one of the open
questions and research directions that Roth and Sotomayor (1990, p. 246) indicate,
namely to “find reasonable assumptions about the preferences of married couples
that assure the nonemptiness of the core.” In other words, are there classes of “real-
world preferences” for which stable matchings always exist? Given the NP completeness (com-
putational complexity) of determining if a couples market has a stable matching (Ronn (1990)),
this question seems even more intricate.
9In order to keep notation as simple as possible, we allow some redundancy in the definition of stability with
respect to (i1) and (b1).
10Roth’s (1984) and our later results do not depend on the tails (not specified by Roth (1984)) of the couples’
preferences, which only contain unacceptable combinations of positions.
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PH PC
h1 h2 h3 h4 s1s2 s3s4
s4 s4 s2 s2 h1h2 h4h2
s2 s3 s3 s4 h4h1 h4h3
s1 s2 s1 s1 h4h3 h4h1
s3 s1 s4 s3 h4h2 h3h1
h1h4 h3h2
h1h3 h3h4
h3h4 h2h4
h3h1 h2h1
h3h2 h2h3
h2h3 h1h2
h2h4 h1h4
h2h1 h1h3
uu uu
· · · · · ·
Table 1: No Stable Matching in a Couples Market (Roth (1984))
3 Main Results: Existence of (Weakly) Stable Matchings and
Domain Maximality
First, we establish an existence result. It is based on the intuition that if there exists no negative
externality from one partner’s job for the other partner or for the couple, then we can treat the
market as if only singles participate. By doing this, we can guarantee the existence of a stable
matching (Gale and Shapley (1962)). This would be the case if couples only apply for jobs
in one city or metropolitan area so that different regional preferences or travel distance are no
longer part of couples’ preferences and therefore the preferences are responsive. For our existence
result, we slightly extend the domain of responsive preferences. The idea of this extension is
that the exact associated preferences that deal with the comparison of unacceptable positions are
irrelevant with respect to stability since an agent can always replace any unacceptable position
with unemployment.
Weakly responsive preferences: Couple c = (sk, sl) has weakly responsive preferences if
there exist preferences sk and sl such that
(i) for all h ∈ H,
(u, h) c (u, u) if and only if h sl u,
(h, u) c (u, u) if and only if h sk u, and
(ii) for all hp, hq, hr ∈ H ∪ {u},
[hpsku, hqslu, and hpskhr imply (hp, hq)c(hr, hq)] and
[hpslu, hqsku, and hpslhr imply (hq, hp)c(hq, hr)].
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Remark 3.1 If these associated individual preferences sk and sl exist, then they are only
uniquely determined for acceptable positions. In other words, if both [sk and sl ] and [′sk
and ′sl ] satisfy the two conditions above, then for all hp, hq ∈ H ∪ {u}, hpskhqsku implies
hp′skhq′sku, and hpslhqslu implies hp′slhq′slu.
Note that responsive preferences are weakly responsive. In the next example we show that
not all weakly responsive preferences are responsive.
Example 3.2 Weakly Responsive but not Responsive
Consider couple c1 = (s1, s2)’s preferences given by P (c1) = (h1, h2), (h1, u), (u, h2), (h2, u),
(u, u), (h3, u), . . . .
Suppose couple c1’s preferences are responsive. Then the (unique) associated individual
preferences are of the form P (s1) = h1, h2, u, h3, h4 and P (s2) = h2, u, . . . . By responsiveness,
(h3, h2)c1(h3, u), a contradiction.
It is easy to see that c1’s preferences are weakly responsive: for any preferences s1 and s2
with P (s1) = h1, h2, u, . . . and P (s2) = h2, u, . . . (tails can be anything) conditions (i) and (ii)
of weak responsiveness are satisfied, independently of the couple’s preferences after (u, u). 
Let (PH , PC) be a couples market and assume that couples have weakly responsive pref-
erences. Then, from the couples’ weakly responsive preferences we can determine associated
individual preferences for all students that are members of a couple. By (PH , PS(PC)) we
denote an associated singles market we obtain by replacing couples and their preferences in
(PH , PC) by individual students and their (possibly not uniquely determined) associated indi-
vidual preferences PS(PC). It is important to note and easy to see that all associated singles
markets have the same set of stable matchings (see Remark 3.1). Notice also that for responsive
preferences there exists a unique associated singles market (PH , PS(PC)).
Theorem 3.3 Stability for Weakly Responsive Preferences
Let (PH , PC) be a couples market where couples have weakly responsive preferences. Then,
any matching that is stable for an associated singles market (PH , PS(PC)) is also stable for
(PH , PC). In particular, there exists a stable matching for (PH , PC).
Proof. Let µ be a stable matching for (PH , PS(PC)) and consider any couple c = (sk, sl).
Stability of µ in (PH , PS(PC)) implies that
µ(sk) sk u and µ(sl) sl u.
If (µ(sk), µ(sl)) = (u, u), then stability condition (i1) is trivially satisfied. If µ(sk) sk u and
µ(sl) = u, then by weak responsiveness (i), (µ(sk), u) c (u, u), which implies (i1). Similarly,
µ(sk) = u and µ(sl) sl u implies (i1). Finally, assume µ(sk) sk u and µ(sl) sl u. Then
by weak responsiveness (ii), (µ(sk), µ(sl)) c (µ(sk), u) c (u, u). Similarly, (µ(sk), µ(sl)) c
(u, µ(sl)) c (u, u). Hence, any stable matching µ in (PH , PS(PC)) is individually rational for
(PH , PC) as well.
Suppose now that µ is not stable for (PH , PC). Hence, there exists a blocking coalition,
for instance ((sk, sl), (hp, hq)). Then, (b1) (hp, hq)c(µ(sk), µ(sl)) and (b2) [hp ∈ H implies
skhpµ(hp)] and [hq ∈ H implies slhqµ(hq)].
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Assume hp ≺sk u and hq ≺sl u. Then by weak responsiveness (ii), (u, u) c (u, hq) c
(hp, hq). Using (b1) it follows that (u, u) c (µ(sk), µ(sl)), contradicting individual rationality
of µ in (PH , PC). Hence, hp sk u or hq sl u.
Assume that hp sk u and hq ≺sl u. Then by weak responsiveness (ii), (hp, u) c (hp, hq).
Hence, ((sk, sl), (hp, u)) is a blocking coalition for µ. Similarly, if hp ≺sk u and hq sl u, then
(u, hq) c (hp, hq) and ((sk, sl), (u, hq)) is a blocking coalition for µ. Hence, without loss of
generality, one can assume that, for blocking coalition ((sk, sl), (hp, hq)),
hp sk u and hq sl u.
Suppose that hpskµ(sk) or hqslµ(sl). Then, according to (b2), (sk, hp) or (sl, hq) can block
µ in (PH , PS(PC)). Hence,
µ(sk)skhp and µ(sl)slhq.
But then weak responsiveness (ii) implies (µ(sk), µ(sl))c(hp, µ(sl))c(hp, hq), which contradicts
(b1). Hence, µ is also stable for (PH , PC). Finally, by Gale and Shapley (1962) a stable matching
for (PH , PS(PC)) always exists. 2
The following example shows that not all stable matchings for (PH , PC) may be stable
for (PH , PS(PC)), even when couples are strongly unemployment averse and have responsive
preferences. The intuition is that some matching that would be unstable in a singles market is
now stable because a student may not want to block it by taking the position of his/her partner.
We use the following convention for this and future examples. If the unemployment option
u is not listed for students, then both couples are strongly unemployment averse.
Example 3.4 (PH ,PC) has More Stable Matchings than (PH ,PS(PC))
Consider the couples market (PH , PC) where preferences are given by Table 2 and the stu-
dents’ individual preferences PS equal P (s1) = P (s3) = h4, h1, h2, h3, u and P (s2) = P (s4) =
h2, h1, h4, h3, u. It can easily be checked that the couples’ preferences can be completed such that
they are responsive with respect to the individual preferences (and are in addition identical).
There are four stable matchings for the couples market (PH , PC) given by µ1(S) = h1, h4, h3, h2,
µ2(S) = h4, h1, h3, h2, µ3(S) = h3, h4, h2, h1, and µ4(S) = h4, h3, h2, h1 (see Appendix). How-
ever, matching µ2 is the unique stable matching for the associated singles market (PH , PS(PC)).

For our next result, a maximal domain result for the existence of stable matchings, we first
introduce a weaker notion of strict unemployment aversion by requiring strict unemployment
aversion only for “acceptable positions.” Since we do not require any type of responsiveness
for the couple’s preferences, we adapt the definition of an acceptable position as follows. Let
c = (sk, sl) and h ∈ H. Then, h is acceptable to student sk if (h, u) c (u, u) and h is acceptable
to student sl if (u, h) c (u, u).
Restricted strict unemployment aversion: Couple c has restricted strictly unemployment
averse preferences if for any pair of acceptable positions it is worse off if one of its partners
looses his/her acceptable position. Formally, for all (hp, hq) such that (hp, u) c (u, u) and
(u, hq) c (u, u), (hp, hq)c(hp, u) and (hp, hq)c(u, hq).11
11The assumption of restricted strict unemployment aversion is particularly realistic in entry level labor markets
where choosing unemployment, while acceptable jobs are available, may be harmful for future job prospects.
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PH PC
h1 h2 h3 h4 s1s2 s3s4
s4 s4 s2 s2 h4h2 h4h2
s2 s3 s3 s4 h4h1 h4h1
s1 s2 s1 s1 h1h2 h1h2
s3 s1 s4 s3 h4h3 h4h3
h1h4 h1h4
h2h1 h2h1
h1h3 h1h3
h2h4 h2h4
h3h2 h3h2
h2h3 h2h3
h3h1 h3h1
h3h4 h3h4
Table 2: (PH , PC) has More Stable Matchings than (PH , PS(PC))
Next we prove that if couples are restricted strictly unemployment averse, then the domain
of weakly responsive preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of stable matchings. In
other words, we show that in a couples market with only restricted strictly unemployment averse
couples and at least one couple whose preferences are not weakly responsive, we can construct
(weakly) responsive preferences for the other couple(s) such that no stable matching exists.
Theorem 3.5 Maximal Domain I
For couples markets with restricted strictly unemployment averse couples, the domain of weakly
responsive preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of stable matchings.
Proof. We prove the theorem by constructing a counter example for each possible violation
of weak responsiveness. Assume that couple c1 = (s1, s2)’s preferences are restricted strictly
unemployment averse, but not weakly responsive. Consider s1 and s2 satisfying weak re-
sponsiveness condition (i). Since couple c1’s preferences are not weakly responsive, s1 and s2
satisfy weak responsiveness condition (ii). It follows that there exist hq, hq ∈ H ∪ {u}, hq 6= hq
such that for some hp, hr ∈ H ∪ {u}, hp 6= hr we have
[hq, hq s1 u, hp s2 u, (hq, hp) c1 (hq, hr)] and [hq, hq s1 u, hr s2 u, (hq, hr) c1 (hq, hp)] or
[hp s1 u, hq, hq s2 u, (hp, hq) c1 (hr, hq))] and [hr s1 u, hq, hq s2 u, (hr, hq) c1 (hp, hq)].
Thus, with a slight abuse of notation12 and without loss of generality,13 there exist h1, h2, h3, h4 ∈
H ∪ {u} such that h1 6= h2, h3 6= h4, and
h1, h2 s1 u, h3, h4 s2 u, (h1, h3) c1 (h1, h4), and (h2, h4) c1 (h2, h3).
12The objects h1, h2, h3, h4 ∈ H ∪ {u} may not be the four hospitals introduced in Section 2.
13The role of s1 and s2 can be switched.
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Since preferences are complete, either (a) (h1, h3) c1 (h2, h4) or (b) (h2, h4) c1 (h1, h3).
We construct a contradiction for Case (a) (Case (b) is analogous). By (a) and transitivity,
(h1, h3) c1 (h2, h3).
Thus, if h1 = u, then (u, h3) c1 (h2, h3). Since h1 6= h2, h2 s1 u. If h3 = u, then h2 s1 u
and weak responsiveness condition (i) implies (h2, u) c1 (u, u). If h3 6= u, then h3 s2 u
and weak responsiveness condition (i) implies (u, h3) c1 (u, u). Thus, by restricted strict
unemployment aversion, (h2, h3) c1 (u, h3). Both cases contradict (u, h3) c1 (h2, h3). Hence,
h1 ∈ H. Similarly, weak responsiveness condition (i), restricted strict unemployment aversion,
and (h1, h3) c1 (h1, h4) imply h3 ∈ H and weak responsiveness condition (i), restricted strict
unemployment aversion, and (h2, h4) c1 (h2, h3) imply h4 ∈ H. Now, for h1, h3, h4 ∈ H we
specify
P (h1) = s3, s1, ∅, . . . ,
P (h3) = s2, s3, ∅, . . . , and
P (h4) = s2, ∅, . . . .
Couple c2 = (s3, s4) has restricted strictly unemployment averse responsive preferences based
on P (s3) = h3, h1, u, . . . and P (s4) = u, . . . .
Case 1: h2 ∈ H. Let P (h2) = s1, ∅, . . . . Note that for any individually rational matching µ,
µ(c2) ∈ {(h3, u), (h1, u), (u, u)}. Assume that µ is stable.
If µ(c2) = (u, u), then µ(c1) = (h1, h3). Hence, µ is blocked by (c2, (h1, u)). If µ(c2) =
(h1, u), then µ(c1) = (h2, h4). Hence, µ is blocked by (c2, (h3, u)). If µ(c2) = (h3, u), then
µ(c1) = (h1, h4) or µ(c1) = (h2, h4). Hence, µ is blocked by (c1, (h1, h3)). Thus, all candidates
for a stable matching are blocked.
Case 2: h2 = u. Note that for any individually rational matching µ, µ(c2) ∈ {(h3, u), (h1, u),
(u, u)}. Assume that µ is stable.
If µ(c2) = (u, u), then µ(c1) = (h1, h3). Hence, µ is blocked by (c2, (h1, u)). If µ(c2) = (h1, u),
then µ(c1) = (u, h4). Hence, µ is blocked by (c2, (h3, u)). If µ(c2) = (h3, u), then µ(c1) = (h1, h4).
Hence, µ is blocked by (c1, (h1, h3)). Thus, all candidates for a stable matching are blocked. 2
It is easy to find examples that demonstrate that the domain of weakly responsive preferences
is no longer maximal once restricted strict unemployment aversion is dropped. For instance a
couple c with P (c) = (h, u), (u, h′), (u, u), . . . will never cause instability, no matter how the
remaining preferences are specified.14
14We sketch the proof of this argument. Consider the following preference domain: any couple c’s preferences are
weakly responsive or are P (c) = (h, u), (u, h′), (u, u), . . ., for some h, h′ ∈ H. Obviously, the new domain strictly
includes the domain of weakly responsive preferences. We construct a stable matching for any profile of preferences
in the new domain as follows. First, construct associated individual preferences for couples with weakly responsive
preferences. Second, for any couple c = (sk, sl) with P (c) = (h, u), (u, h
′), (u, u), . . ., define associated individual
preferences by P (sk) = h, u, . . . and P (sl) = h
′, u, . . .. Now apply the student-optimal deferred acceptance
algorithm (Gale and Shapley (1962)) to the associated singles market to obtain a tentative matching. If this
matching is individually rational for all couples, then it is stable in the original couples market. Since individual
rationality is automatically satisfied for weakly responsive couples, if individual rationality is violated for a couple
c = (sk, sl), then there are h, h
′ ∈ H such that P (c) = (h, u), (u, h′), (u, u), . . . and µ(c) = (h, h′). Redefine
associated individual preferences by P (sk) = h, u, . . . and P (sl) = u, . . .. The student-optimal deferred acceptance
algorithm applied to the adjusted associated singles market gives another tentative matching where students are
weakly better off. If this matching is individually rational for all couples, then it is stable in the original couples
market. If individual rationality is violated for any couple, then redefine associated individual preferences, and
so on. This procedure will finally produce a stable matching for the original couples market.
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Note that the only weakly responsive preferences for a couple c that satisfy the stronger
condition of strict unemployment aversion are responsive preferences where all hospitals are
acceptable, that is, a strictly unemployment averse couple c = (sk, sl) with weakly responsive
preferences must in fact have responsive preferences with unique associated individual prefer-
ences that can be represented by P (sk) = . . . , u and P (sl) = . . . , u.
Corollary 3.6 Maximal Domain II
For couples markets with strictly unemployment averse couples, the domain of responsive pref-
erences where all hospitals are considered acceptable in the associated individual preferences is a
maximal domain for the existence of stable matchings.
Next, we drop the condition of (restricted) strict unemployment aversion and address the
question whether or not one can enlarge the domain of (weakly) responsive preferences while
still guaranteeing the existence of stable matchings. In fact, we start with a somewhat less
ambitious task. First we relax the requirement of stability by excluding myopic behavior of
blocking coalitions and ask for which reasonable preference domains “weakly stable” matchings
always exist (see Klijn and Masso´ (2003) for weak stability in singles markets).
To model non-myopic behavior we assume that if the assignment of hospitals to students and
students to hospitals that a blocking coalition proposes for themselves is not likely to be their
final “match,” then the blocking will not take place. Let µ be a matching and ((t1, t2), (l1, l2))
be a blocking coalition. We model two cases in which a blocking coalition’s match most likely
will not be their final match:
• the couple (t1, t2) that participates in the blocking coalition ((t1, t2), (l1, l2)) can do better
for themselves in another blocking coalition ((t1, t2), (k1, k2)) such that the other agents
(one or both hospitals) that are participating in both blocking coalitions are not worse off.
So, if couple (t1, t2) also blocks µ together with hospitals (k1, k2), then (t1, t2) prefers
(k1, k2) to (l1, l2), which it would be matched with in the other blocking coalition, i.e.,
(d1) (k1, k2) (t1,t2)(l1, l2).
If a hospital participates in both blocking coalitions, then it is not worse off, i.e., if for
some i, j = 1, 2, ki = lj , then (d2) tikitj .
• a hospital lp that participates in the blocking coalition ((t1, t2), (l1, l2)) can do better for
itself in another blocking coalition ((z1, z2), (k1, k2)) such that the other agents (the other
hospital or the couple) participating in both blocking coalitions are not worse off.
Let lp = kr, tp be the student that is assigned to hospital lp in blocking coalition
((t1, t2), (l1, l2)), and zr be the student that is assigned to hospital kr = lp in blocking
coalition ((z1, z2), (k1, k2)).
So, if hospital kr = lp blocks µ together with hospital ks ({kr, ks} = {k1, k2}) and couple
(z1, z2), then it obtains a better student, i.e., (d2) zrlptp.
If the other hospital lq participates in both blocking coalitions (i.e., ks = lq), then it is not
worse off, i.e., (d2) zslq tq.
If the new blocking coalition is formed with the same couple, then it is not worse off, i.e.,
(d1) (k1, k2)(t1,t2)(l1, l2).
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We now give the formal definition. Let µ be a matching. We say that a blocking coalition
((t1, t2), (l1, l2)) is dominated by another blocking coalition ((z1, z2), (k1, k2)) 6= ((t1, t2), (l1, l2)),
if
(d1) if (z1, z2) = (t1, t2), then (k1, k2)(z1,z2)(l1, l2);
(d2) for all i, j = 1, 2, if ki = lj ∈ H, then zikitj ;
(d3) (z1, z2) = (t1, t2) or ki = lj ∈ H for some i, j = 1, 2.15
A matching µ is weakly stable if it is individually rational and all blocking coalitions are dom-
inated. Clearly, a stable matching is weakly stable. Note also that a matching with a single
blocking coalition cannot be weakly stable. In some contexts it is natural to focus only on
weakly stable matching with full employment (for instance when couples are strongly unem-
ployment averse). For Roth’s example (Table 1) there are three weakly stable matchings with
full employment (see Appendix).
Now one might wonder whether with this weaker concept of stability we may extend the existence
result in Theorem 3.3 to a larger class of preferences. For singles markets Klijn and Masso´ (2003)
show that the set of weakly stable matchings contains Zhou’s (1994) bargaining set. Hence,
Zhou’s (1994) result that in general the bargaining set is nonempty indicates that studying
weak stability might be a fruitful approach. The next theorem, however, crushes any hope for
this approach.
Theorem 3.7 No Weak Stability
In couples markets the set of weakly stable matchings may be empty.
The following example proves Theorem 3.7. In the example, we construct a couples market
where couples have leader-follower responsive preferences. Then, we create a new market by
switching two pairs of hospitals in one couple’s preference relation. However similar the two
markets may seem, there is no weakly stable matching for the new market. In particular, there
is no stable matching for the new market.
Example 3.8 Wanting to be a Little Bit Closer may create Instability
Consider a couples market where preferences are given by Table 3 and the students’ individ-
ual preferences equal P (s1) = h3, h4, h1, h2, u, P (s2) = h1, h2, h3, h4, u, and P (s3) = P (s4) =
h2, h1, h3, h4, u. Differences in the students’ individual preferences can be easily explained by
“regional preferences”: even though there may exist a unanimous ranking of hospitals according
to prestige or salary, students may rank certain hospitals differently because they prefer to live in
a certain region, for instance, they prefer to live on the West Coast instead of on the East Coast,
or vice versa. Note that both couples are strongly unemployment averse and the first couple’s
preferences are leader-follower responsive. The second couple’s preferences are obtained by first
constructing leader-follower responsive preferences and then switching the last and second from
last entries (in fact, only two hospitals for agent s4 are switched – the switch is denoted in
boldface in Table 3). This switch can be easily justified by assuming that hospital h3 is closer
than hospital h2 to hospital h4. In the worst case scenario where leader s3 is assigned to h4, the
15By (d3) we ensure that we only compare conflicting blocking coalitions in the sense that there exists at least
one agent that is present in both blocking coalitions. Otherwise, domination is not possible.
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couple’s wish to be closer together may overrule any preference for follower s4. Note also that
the hospitals have identical preferences over students, which can be easily justified if hospitals
rank students according to final grades or other test scores. It is tedious but not difficult to check
that no weakly stable matching with full employment, and therefore by individual rationality
no weakly stable matching, exists (see Appendix). 
PH PC
h1 h2 h3 h4 s1s2 s3s4
s4 s4 s4 s4 h3h1 h2h1
s1 s1 s1 s1 h3h2 h2h3
s2 s2 s2 s2 h3h4 h2h4
s3 s3 s3 s3 h4h1 h1h2
h4h2 h1h3
h4h3 h1h4
h1h2 h3h2
h1h3 h3h1
h1h4 h3h4
h2h1 h4h3
h2h3 h4h1
h2h4 h4h2
Table 3: Wanting to be a Little Bit Closer may create Instability
Example 3.8 exhibits almost responsive preferences, except for a single switch that can easily
be explained by the desire of couple (s3, s4) to be closer together if the leader is assigned to
hospital h4, his/her worst option. Therefore, this example brings us closer to answering Roth
and Sotomayor’s (1990) question in the negative in the following sense. If we extend the domain
of (weakly) responsive preferences to allow for non-responsive switches that could be due to
distance considerations (which is the very reason that couples may have different preferences
than if they were singles), then stable matchings may not exist.
The next example is another one without a stable matching that is based on simple pref-
erences that can be explained intuitively. Note that in the previous example students have
different regional preferences (see explanation in Example 3.8), which create different individual
preferences. The following example deals with preferences that are based on identical individual
preferences of students (no differences because of regional preferences). But, in addition, we
assume that if positions are too far away, the unemployment of one partner may be preferred to
being separated, that is, we drop the assumption of strong unemployment aversion. This exam-
ple also illustrates how students’ individual preferences may differ from the students’ associated
preferences as derived from the couples’ preferences.16
16Cantala (2004) also studies the existence of stable matchings in relation to distance aspects. He shows
nonexistence of stable matchings for some restricted preference domain, for instance he assumes that “prefer-
ences of couples satisfy the strong regional lexicographic conditions and that couples face the same geographical
constraint.”
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Example 3.9 No Stability because Separation is out of the Question
Consider the couples market (PH , PC) where preferences are given by Table 4 and the students’
individual preferences PS for s ∈ S equal P (s) = h1, h2, h3, h4, u. Both couples have the same
preference relation. Note that as singles all students like hospital h1 best. However, assume that
hospitals h2, h3, and h4 are close together, while hospital h1 is very far away. Now, instead of
being separated, the partner of a student who is matched to hospital h1 would not accept his/her
position because unemployment is preferable to separation. When ranking matchings consisting
of two positions, each couple uses lexicographic preferences with respect to the quality of the
position. Note that if we focus only on individually rational matchings with full employment,
then the agents’ preferences are responsive. In this case, a student’s derived associated individual
preference over hospitals (excluding u) equals h2, h3, h4, h1. Comparing this to the student’s
individual preferences, we see that hospital h1 moved from being the best position for the single
student to being the worst position for the member of a couple, because working at h1 either
means separation from or unemployment of the partner.
It is easy to prove that no stable matching exists. Moreover, there is no weakly stable
matching with full employment (this follows easily since any such matching is not individually
rational). However, one can show for instance that the matching given by µ(S) = u, h1, h4, h3
is weakly stable. We prove these statements in the Appendix. 
PH PC
h1 h2 h3 h4 s1s2 s3s4
s1 s1 s1 s1 h2h3 h2h3
s3 s3 s3 s3 h2h4 h2h4
s4 s4 s4 s4 h3h2 h3h2
s2 s2 s2 s2 h3h4 h3h4
h4h2 h4h2
h4h3 h4h3
h1u h1u
h2u h2u
h3u h3u
h4u h4u
uh1 uh1
uh2 uh2
uh3 uh3
uh4 uh4
h1h2 h1h2
h1h3 h1h3
h1h4 h1h4
h2h1 h2h1
h3h1 h3h1
h4h1 h4h1
uu uu
Table 4: Separation is out of the Question
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4 Further Results for Stable Matchings when Preferences are
Responsive: Optimality, Filled Positions, and Manipulation
Recall that when preferences are responsive one can construct a unique associated singles market
with a nonempty set of stable matchings that is included in the set of stable matchings of the
original couples market. In this section we analyze properties of the set of stable matchings for
couples markets when preferences are responsive.
Apart from the fact that stable matchings always exist in the absence of couples, singles
markets have other interesting features. If preferences are strict, the set of stable matchings has
the structure of a (distributive) lattice, which we explain next.
Let (PH , PS) be a singles market and µ and µ′ two of its matchings. We define a function
λ ≡ µ∨S µ′ that assigns to each student his/her more preferred match from µ and µ′. Formally,
let λ = µ ∨S µ′ be defined for all s ∈ S by λ(s) := µ(s) if µ(s)s µ′(s) and λ(s) := µ′(s)
otherwise. In a similar way we define the function µ∧S µ′, which gives each student his/her less
preferred match. In a dual way we define a function λ˜ ≡ µ ∨H µ′ that assigns to each hospital
its more preferred match from µ and µ′. Formally, let λ˜ = µ ∨H µ′ be defined for all h ∈ H
by λ˜(h) := µ(h) if µ(h)h µ′(h) and λ˜(h) := µ′(h) otherwise. In a similar way we define the
function µ ∧H µ′, which gives each hospital its less preferred match.
For singles markets, Knuth (1976) published the following theorem, but it is attributed to
John Conway. One of the implications of the theorem is that there is a polarization of interests
between the two sides of the market along the set of stable matchings.
Theorem 4.1 Conway’s Lattice Theorem for Singles Markets
Let (PH , PS) be a singles market and µ and µ′ be two stable matchings. Then, µ∨S µ′ = µ∧H µ′
and µ ∧S µ′ = µ ∨H µ′ are stable matchings. Furthermore, since the “sup operator” ∨S and the
“inf operator” ∧S satisfy the law of distributivity, the set of stable matchings for singles markets
form a distributive lattice.
Conway’s Lattice Theorem implies that there exists a unique best stable matching µS (called
the student-optimal matching) favored by the students, which is the worst stable matching for
the hospitals, and vice versa there exists a unique best stable matching µH (called the hospital-
optimal matching) favored by the hospitals, which is the worst stable matching for the students.
In fact, Gale and Shapley (1962) already proved the existence of µS and µH , and provided an
algorithm, called the Deferred Acceptance algorithm, to calculate these matchings.
In the next theorem we demonstrate that for responsive preferences PC the lattice struc-
ture of the set of stable matchings in (PH , PS(PC)) need not carry over to (PH , PC). It
strengthens the negative result (on the general domain of couples preferences) by Aldershof and
Carducci (1996) that there may be no optimal matching for either side of the market. We first
introduce some more notation.
Let µ be a matching for couples market (PH , PC). Then, for couple c = (sk, sl), we define
µ(c) := (µ(sk), µ(sl)). For any two matchings µ and µ′, we define a function λ¯ ≡ µ ∨C µ′ that
assigns to each couple its more preferred match from µ and µ′. Formally, let λ¯ = µ ∨C µ′ be
defined for all c ∈ C by λ¯(c) := µ(c) if µ(c)c µ′(c) and λ¯(c) := µ′(c) otherwise. In a similar way
we define the function µ ∧C µ′, which gives each couple its less preferred match. The definition
of functions µ ∨H µ′ and µ ∧H µ′ is the same as before. The function λ¯ = µ ∨C µ′ induces in a
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natural way a matching if λ¯(s) 6= λ¯(t) for all students s, t ∈ S, s 6= t. Similar statements hold
for µ ∧C µ′, µ ∨H µ′, and µ ∧H µ′.
A stable matching µC is the couples maximal matching if no other stable matching µ gives to
any couple c a pair of positions µ(c) that the couple (weakly) prefers to µC(c). A stable matching
µ
C
is the couples minimal matching if no other stable matching µ gives to any couple c a pair
of positions µ(c) that the couple likes (weakly) less than µ
C
(c). Similarly, a stable matching µH
is the hospitals maximal matching if no other stable matching µ gives to any hospital h a match
µ(h) that the hospital (weakly) prefers to µH(h). Finally, a stable matching µH is the hospitals
minimal matching if no other stable matching µ gives to any hospital h a match µ(h) that the
hospital likes (weakly) less than µ
H
(h).
Theorem 4.2 Loss of Lattice Structure
Let (PH , PC) be a couples market where couples have responsive preferences. Let µ and µ′ be
two stable matchings.
(i) Functions µ ∨C µ′, µ ∧C µ′, µ ∨H µ′, and µ ∧H µ′ may not be matchings. Furthermore, the
duality for singles markets between ∨S and ∧H (∧S and ∨H respectively) need not carry
over; that is, possibly µ ∨C µ′ 6= µ ∧H µ′ and µ ∧C µ′ 6= µ ∨H µ′.
(ii) The optimal matchings µC , µC , µH , and µH may not exist.
Proof.
(i) If we take µ = µ2 and µ′ = µ3 (µ = µ2 and µ′ = µ4) in Example 3.4, then µ∨C µ′ and µ∧C µ′
(µ ∨H µ′ and µ ∧H µ′) are not matchings.
(ii) It can be checked easily that none of the four stable matchings in Example 3.4 satisfies the
definition of µC , µC , µH , or µH . 2
Since in general there is more than one stable matching, a criterion one might want to employ
to select a subset of stable matchings is (the maximization of) the number of matched agents.
However, for singles markets the set of matched agents does not vary from one stable matching
to another. In other words, for singles markets the set of unmatched agents is always the same
for all stable matchings (McVitie and Wilson (1970), Roth (1982)).17 In contrast, for couples
markets Aldershof and Carducci (1996) show that on the general domain of couples preferences
different stable matchings may have a different number of positions filled. We strengthen this
result by showing that on the restricted domain of responsive preferences the number of positions
that are filled at different stable matchings may vary as well.
Theorem 4.3 Different Number of Filled Positions across Stable Matchings
Let (PH , PC) be a couples market where couples have responsive preferences. Then there may
be stable matchings that leave different numbers of positions unfilled.
The following example, which is a slight variation of the example used by Aldershof and Car-
ducci (1996), proves Theorem 4.3.
17Mart´ınez et al. (2000) study this question for many-to-one matching markets without money. They show
that in case hospitals have “substitutable” preferences the number of matched agents may vary from one stable
matching to another. On the positive side, however, they establish that if preferences profiles satisfy certain axioms
then the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching, among other desirable properties.
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Example 4.4 Consider a couples market where preferences are given by Table 5 and the stu-
dents’ individual preferences equal P (s1) = h3, h2, u, h4, h1, P (s2) = h3, h2, h4, u, h1, P (s3) =
h2, h1, h4, u, h3, and P (s4) = h1, h3, u, h2, h4. It can easily be checked that the couples’ prefer-
ences can be completed such that they are responsive with respect to the individual preferences.
There are two stable matchings given by µ1(H) = s4, s2, s1, s3 and µ2(H) = s4, s3, s2, ∅ (see
Appendix), which obviously leave different numbers of positions unfilled.
For later use we note that one can easily check that for any associated singles market
(PH , PS(PC)) the unique stable matching is µ2, which hence is the outcome of the Deferred
Acceptance algorithm by Gale and Shapley (1962), i.e., both the student-optimal and hospital-
optimal matching. 
PH PC
h1 h2 h3 h4 s1s2 s3s4
s4 s2 s2 s2 h3h2 h2h1
s3 s3 s4 s3 h2h3 h2h3
∅ s1 s1 ∅ h3h4 h4h1
· · · ∅ ∅ · · · h2h4 h1h3
s4 s3 uh3 h4h3
uh2 h2u
uh4 h1u
h3u h4u
h2u uh1
uu uh3
· · · uu
· · ·
Table 5: Different Number of Filled Positions across Stable Matchings
Note that we could also use Example 4.4 to prove Theorem 4.2. However, in Example 4.4 it
is essential that some students are not acceptable for some hospitals and that some couples
find certain positions unacceptable. Example 3.4 demonstrates that the negative results in
Theorem 4.2 remain true on the smaller domain of responsive preferences where all hospitals
and all students are mutually acceptable.
Before stating our next result, we define a matching mechanism as a function that assigns
a matching to each couples market. A stable-matching mechanism is a matching mechanism
that assigns a stable matching to a couples market whenever it has a nonempty set of stable
matchings. A stable-matching mechanism is strategy-proof if no couple and no hospital can ever
benefit from misrepresenting its preferences. In other words, a stable-matching mechanism is
strategy-proof if truth telling is a dominant strategy.
Our final result on the set of stable matchings for couples markets with responsive preferences
is that there exists no strategy-proof stable-matching mechanism based on revealed preferences.
More precisely, we show that there is no stable-matching mechanism for which stating the true
preferences is a dominant strategy for every couple.
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Theorem 4.5 No Strategy-Proof Stable-Matching Mechanism
There is no stable-matching mechanism for couples markets with responsive preferences for which
stating the true preferences is a dominant strategy for every couple. In other words, for any
stable-matching mechanism there exists a couples market with responsive preferences such that
at least one couple can profit from misrepresenting its preferences.
Proof. To prove the theorem we consider the couples market (PH , PC) in Example 4.4 (where
couples’ preferences are responsive). We show that every stable-matching mechanism makes it
possible for some couple to profit by misrepresenting its preferences.
Suppose the mechanism chooses matching µ1. If couple c2 changes its preferences from P (c2)
to responsive preferences Q(c2) = (h2, h3), (h2, h1), (h1, h3), (h4, h3), (h4, h1), (h2, u), (h1, u),
(h4, u), (u, h3), (u, h1), (u, u), . . . while everyone else states their true preferences, then µ2 is
the only stable matching with respect to the stated preferences (PH , {P (c1), Q(c2)}), see Ap-
pendix. So, any stable-matching mechanism must select µ2 when the stated preferences are
(PH , {P (c1), Q(c2)}). Since µ2(c2) = (h2, h1) c2 (h4, h1) = µ1(c2), it is not a dominant strat-
egy for couple c2 to state its true preferences.
Suppose the mechanism chooses matching µ2. If couple c1 changes its preferences from P (c1)
to responsive preferences Q(c1) = (h3, h2), (h3, u), (u, h2), (u, u), . . . while everyone else states
their true preferences, then µ1 is the only stable matching with respect to the stated preferences
(PH , {Q(c1), P (c2)}), see Appendix. So, any stable-matching mechanism must select µ1 when
the stated preferences are (PH , {Q(c1), P (c2)}). Since µ1(c1) = (h3, h2) c1 (u, h3) = µ2(c1), it
is not a dominant strategy for couple c1 to state its true preferences. 2
In fact, if in Example 4.4 the stable-matching mechanism chooses matching µ1, then also
hospital h3 can profit by changing its preferences from P (h3) to Q(h3) = s2, s4, ∅, . . ., since the
unique stable matching for ({P (h1), P (h2), Q(h3), P (h4)}, PC) is µ2 and µ2(h3) = s2 h3 s1 =
µ1(h3) (see Appendix).
Note that it is not surprising that none of the hospitals in Example 4.4 can profitably
misstate its preferences when the matching mechanism chooses µ2. The reason for this is that
µ2 is the hospital-optimal matching in (any of) the associated singles market(s) (see remark in
Example 4.4). By a result due to Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) it is a dominant
strategy for each hospital to state its true preferences in the associated singles market(s) if the
hospital-optimal matching is always picked. In other words, a misrepresentation of some hospital
h’s preferences in a couples market will always give rise to a stable matching that is weakly worse
for h compared with the hospital-optimal matching (of the associated singles market(s)) when
stating its true preferences. The following possibility theorem, which also holds on the domain
of weakly responsive preferences, is an immediate consequence of this observation.
Theorem 4.6 No Profitable Misrepresentation by Individual Hospitals
The stable-matching mechanism that yields the hospital-optimal matching (in the associated
singles market(s)) makes it a dominant strategy for each hospital to state its true preferences.
Remark 4.7 Discussion of Possible Implications of Theorems 4.3, 4.5, and 4.6.
One of the main results of this article is the existence of stable matchings if couples have (weakly)
responsive preferences. If a labor market the couples apply to is regional and/or the positions’
duration is short, which for example is the case of some U.K. entry level labor markets for
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physicians and surgeons (see Roth (1991)), then it seems likely that couples have responsive
preferences. Thus, given such a situation, one could derive the (unique) associated individual
preferences from the couples’ preferences and apply the Deferred Acceptance algorithm by Gale
and Shapley (1962) to obtain a stable matching. However, in view of Theorem 4.3 it is not
clear whether this is desirable regarding the number of matched agents. For instance, consider
Example 4.4 where the Deferred Acceptance algorithm picks stable matching µ2 which does not
maximize the number of matched agents and leaves one agent unemployed. On the other hand,
Theorem 4.6 shows that if we choose µ2, which is the hospital-optimal matching resulting from
the Deferred Acceptance algorithm, then at least hospitals have no incentives to misrepresent
their preferences. However, no matter which matching the stable-matching mechanism chooses,
by Theorem 4.5 stating their true preferences is not a dominant strategy for every couple.
5 Responsiveness for Couples Markets and Previous Notions of
Substitutability for Singles Markets
As already discussed in the Introduction, our existence results of stable matchings when couples
have (weakly) responsive preferences to some extent mirrors other results that demonstrate that
a sufficient amount of substitutability implies the existence of stable matchings for the match-
ing market in question; see for instance Roth (1985, many-to-one matching without money,
also called the college admissions model), Kelso and Crawford (1982, many-to-one matching
with money), Abdulkadirog˘lu (2003, college admissions with affirmative action), and Hatfield
and Milgrom (2004, two-sided matching with contracts). In contrast to our notion of (weak)
responsiveness, all substitutability conditions in these papers apply to the preferences of the sup-
ply side (hospitals or firms) over sets of agents (students or workers), while our responsiveness
condition applies to preferences of the demand side (couples of students) over ordered pairs of
hospitals (not sets!). Alkan and Gale’s (2003, many-to-many schedule matching) substitutabil-
ity condition of “persistence” in fact applies to both, the demand and the supply side, but still
does not apply to ordered pairs as in our model. It is interesting to note that both, Alkan
and Gale’s “persistence” as well as Hatfield and Milgrom’s (2004) “substitution” condition en-
compass Roth’s (1985) “responsiveness” and Kelso and Crawford’s (1982) “gross substitutes”
condition. Here, in order to compare our results with previous results for “matching markets
with substitutability” in a comprehensive way, we focus on Hatfield and Milgrom’s (2004) results
for matching markets with contracts.
Hatfield and Milgrom (2004) present a new model of matching with contracts that encom-
passes some of the previous classical models such as Gale and Shapley’s (1962) and Roth’s (1985)
college admissions problem or the Kelso-Crawford’s (1982) taˆtonnement model of wage determi-
nation in labor markets. In one of their main results Hatfield and Milgrom (2004, Theorem 5)
identify a maximal set of preferences over contracts (the domain of substitutable preferences)
for which a stable matching exists. The proof of this result inspired our proof of Theorem 3.5
(Maximal Domain I result), but in addition to our substitutability requirement of responsive-
ness, we had to add restricted unemployment aversion (the fact that we consider ordered pairs
of positions for couples changes the formulation and several parts of the proof). Once we drop
the unemployment aversion requirement, we were not able to obtain a similar maximal domain
result. Instead, we demonstrated with two instructive examples (Examples 3.8 and 3.9) how a
single couple may cause a labor market to be unstable even though its preferences may be almost
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responsive. Example 3.8 also proves that once preferences are not responsive, even weakly stable
matchings may not exist.
In addition to the maximal domain result, Hatfield and Milgrom (2004, Theorem 3) demon-
strate that under their substitution condition, a stable matching can be obtained by applying
a generalization of Gale and Shapley’s (1962) Deferred Acceptance algorithm. In contrast to
this approach, we show that if preferences are (weakly) responsive one can construct a singles
market such that any stable matching in the singles market is also stable in the original couples
market (Theorem 3.3). In particular, this means that we can construct a stable matching for
any (weakly) responsive couples market using the original Gale and Shapley’s (1962) Deferred
Acceptance algorithm. In fact, a generalization of the Deferred Acceptance mechanism a` la
Hatfield and Milgrom (2004) would not work for responsive couples markets since the set of
stable matchings may not form a lattice (see Theorem 4.2 versus Hatfield and Milgrom (2004),
Theorem 4).
Next, Theorem 4.3 demonstrates that even for responsive couples markets different numbers
of positions may be filled across stable matchings. Hatfield and Milgrom (2004) also confirm
this violation of the so-called rural hospital theorem (its original version is due to Roth (1986))
for matching markets with contracts under the assumption of substitutability. However, by
additionally requiring that preferences on the supply side also satisfy the “law of aggregate
demand,” they are able to restore the rural hospital theorem (Hatfield and Milgrom (2004),
Theorem 8). Since the definition of the law of aggregate demand depends on the cardinality of
sets of students chosen by the hospitals, no corresponding requirement exists for couples markets
where we compare ordered pairs of positions and not the sets of positions a couple consumes.
Finally, we prove that there is no stable-matching mechanism for couples markets with
responsive preferences for which stating the true preferences is a dominant strategy for every
couple (Theorem 4.5). A similar result has been obtained already for the college admissions
problem: Roth (1985) proves that even though colleges have responsive preferences over sets
of students, no stable-matching mechanism exists that makes it a dominant strategy for all
colleges to state their true preferences. Since Hatfield and Milgrom’s (2004) model encompasses
Roth’s (1985) formulation of the college admissions problem with responsive preferences, Roth’s
counterexample also holds in the matching with contracts context.
6 Appendix: Remaining Proofs
Proof of statement in Example 3.4: In Table 6 we list all 24 individually rational (full
employment) matchings for the couples market with preferences given by Table 2. For each
of the 20 unstable matchings we provide a blocking coalition. Note that the stable matchings
detected in Table 6 correspond to the stable matchings listed in Example 3.4 as follows: matching
no. 6 ∼ µ1, no. 12 ∼ µ2, no. 23 ∼ µ3, and no. 24 ∼ µ4. 2
Proof of existence of three weakly stable matching with full employment for
Roth’s (1984) example: We show that for the couples market with preferences given by
Table 1 there are at least three weakly stable matchings with full employment. It can easily be
checked that none of the other 21 individually rational (full employment) matchings is weakly
stable.18 In Table 7 we list the three weakly stable matchings along with all blocking coalitions.
18We only want to point out that even if there are no stable matchings, there may be weakly stable matchings.
In fact, as this example shows, the set of weakly stable matchings may contain more than one matching. For this
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For each matching and for each blocking coalition we provide another, dominating blocking
coalition. 2
Proof of nonexistence of weakly stable matchings in Example 3.8: We still have to
check that for the couples market with preferences given by Table 3 none of the 24 individually
rational (full employment) matchings is weakly stable. We do this below by providing in Tables 8
and 9 at least one undominated blocking coalition for each full employment matching. 2
Proof of statements in Example 3.9: To show that for the couples market defined by Table 4
no stable matching exists, let H∗ be the seven most preferred hospital combinations depicted in
Table 4, i.e., H∗ = {(h2, h3), (h2, h4), (h3, h2), (h3, h4), (h4, h2), (h4, h3), (h1, u)}.
Let µ be a stable matching. Suppose that (µ(s1), µ(s2)) 6∈ H∗. Then, ((s1, s2), (h1, ∅)) is a
blocking coalition. Hence, (µ(s1), µ(s2)) ∈ H∗.
Suppose that (µ(s3), µ(s4)) 6∈ H∗. If (µ(s1), µ(s2)) = (h1, u), then ((s3, s4), (h2, h3)) or
((s3, s4), (h2, h4)) is a blocking coalition. If (µ(s1), µ(s2)) 6= (h1, u), then ((s3, s4), (h1, ∅)) is a
blocking coalition. Hence, (µ(s3), µ(s4)) ∈ H∗.
So, µ is one of the 12 matchings depicted in Table 10. However, for each of these matchings
a blocking coalition exists: a contradiction. Hence, there is no stable matching.
It remains to be proven that the (individually rational) matching µ given by µ(S) =
u, h1, h4, h3 is weakly stable. In Table 11 we list all blocking coalitions for this matching, along
with the blocking coalitions they are dominated by. Since each blocking coalition is dominated
by some other blocking coalition it follows that µ is weakly stable. 2
Proof of statement in Example 4.4: To show that for the couples market defined by Table 5
the only two stable matchings are given by µ1(H) = s4, s2, s1, s3 and µ2(H) = s4, s3, s2, ∅, we
first consider all 69 individually rational matchings. If we delete all the matchings that leave
a student and a hospital unmatched, while in fact they are mutually acceptable, then only the
13 matchings in Table 12 remain. In the table we give for each matching a blocking coalition
whenever possible. Note that the stable matchings detected in Table 12 correspond to the stable
matchings listed in Example 4.4 as follows: matching no. 11 ∼ µ1 and no. 13 ∼ µ2. 2
Proof of statements in Theorem 4.5: First we prove that µ2 is the only stable matching
in couples market (PH , {P (c1), Q(c2)}). We consider all 69 individually rational matchings. If
we delete all the matchings that leave a student and a hospital unmatched, while in fact they
are mutually acceptable, then only the 13 matchings in Table 13 remain. In the table we give
for each matching a blocking coalition whenever possible. Note that the only stable matching
detected in Table 13 is µ2.
It remains to prove that µ1 is the only stable matching in couples market
(PH , {Q(c1), P (c2)}). We consider all 31 individually rational matchings. If we delete all the
matchings that leave a student and a hospital unmatched, while in fact they are mutually ac-
ceptable, then only the 6 matchings in Table 14 remain. In the table we give for each matching
a blocking coalition whenever possible. Note that the only stable matching detected in Table 14
is µ1. 2
reason, and also to save space, we do not elaborate the proof that there are no other weakly stable matchings,
which can be obtained upon request.
22
Proof of statement right after Theorem 4.5: We have to prove that µ2 is the unique
stable matching for ({P (h1), P (h2), Q(h3), P (h4)}, PC). We consider all 52 individually rational
matchings. If we delete all the matchings that leave a student and a hospital unmatched, while
in fact they are mutually acceptable, then only the 11 matchings in Table 15 remain. In the
table we give for each matching a blocking coalition whenever possible. Note that the only stable
matching detected in Table 15 is µ2. 2
Hospitals Blocking coalitions?
no. h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals
1 s1 s2 s3 s4 (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
2 s1 s2 s4 s3 (s1, s2) (h4, h2)
3 s1 s3 s2 s4 (s1, s2) (h1, h4)
4 s1 s3 s4 s2 (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
5 s1 s4 s2 s3 (s1, s2) (h4, h1)
6 s1 s4 s3 s2 −− −−
7 s2 s1 s3 s4 (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
8 s2 s1 s4 s3 (s1, s2) (h4, h2)
9 s2 s3 s1 s4 (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
10 s2 s3 s4 s1 (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
11 s2 s4 s1 s3 (s1, s2) (h4, h1)
12 s2 s4 s3 s1 −− −−
13 s3 s1 s2 s4 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
14 s3 s1 s4 s2 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
15 s3 s2 s1 s4 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
16 s3 s2 s4 s1 (s3, s4) (h1, h2)
17 s3 s4 s1 s2 (s1, s2) (h1, h4)
18 s3 s4 s2 s1 (s1, s2) (h4, h1)
19 s4 s1 s2 s3 (s1, s2) (h4, h2)
20 s4 s1 s3 s2 (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
21 s4 s2 s1 s3 (s1, s2) (h4, h2)
22 s4 s2 s3 s1 (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
23 s4 s3 s1 s2 −− −−
24 s4 s3 s2 s1 −− −−
Table 6: Example 3.4 / Table 2, all individually rational matchings (with a blocking coalition
when possible)
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Hospitals Blocking coalitions
no. h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals Dominated by
1 s3 s1 s2 s4 (s1, s2) (h1, h2) (s3, s4) (h2, h4)
(s1, s2) (h1, h4) (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
(s1, s2) (h1, h3) (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
(s3, s4) (h2, h4) (s1, s2) (h1, h4)
(s3, s4) (h2, h1) (s3, s4) (h2, h4)
(s3, s4) (h1, h2) (s1, s2) (h1, h3)
2 s3 s1 s4 s2 (s1, s2) (h1, h2) (s3, s4) (h3, h1)
(s1, s2) (h1, h4) (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
(s1, s2) (h1, h3) (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
(s1, s2) (h3, h4) (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
(s1, s2) (h3, h1) (s1, s2) (h3, h4)
(s1, s2) (h3, h2) (s1, s2) (h3, h4)
(s1, s2) (h2, h3) (s1, s2) (h1, h4)
(s3, s4) (h3, h1) (s1, s2) (h2, h3)
(s3, s4) (h3, h2) (s3, s4) (h3, h1)
(s3, s4) (h2, h1) (s3, s4) (h3, h1)
(s3, s4) (h2, h3) (s3, s4) (h3, h1)
(s3, s4) (h1, h2) (s3, s4) (h3, h2)
3 s3 s2 s4 s1 (s1, s2) (h1, h2) (s3, s4) (h2, h4)
(s1, s2) (h4, h1) (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
(s1, s2) (h4, h3) (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
(s3, s4) (h3, h1) (s1, s2) (h4, h3)
(s3, s4) (h3, h2) (s3, s4) (h3, h1)
(s3, s4) (h3, h4) (s3, s4) (h3, h1)
(s3, s4) (h2, h4) (s3, s4) (h3, h1)
(s3, s4) (h2, h1) (s3, s4) (h3, h1)
(s3, s4) (h2, h3) (s3, s4) (h3, h1)
(s3, s4) (h1, h2) (s3, s4) (h3, h2)
(s3, s4) (h1, h4) (s3, s4) (h1, h2)
Table 7: Roth’s (1984) example / Table 1, three weakly stable matchings
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Hospitals Blocking coalitions
no. h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals Undominated?
1 s1 s2 s3 s4 (s1, s2) (h3, h2) x
(s3, s4) (h3, h2) x
(s3, s4) (h3, h1)
2 s1 s2 s4 s3 (s1, s2) (h4, h2) x
3 s1 s3 s2 s4 (s1, s2) (h3, h2) x
(s1, s2) (h1, h2)
(s3, s4) (h2, h1)
(s3, s4) (h2, h3)
4 s1 s3 s4 s2 (s1, s2) (h4, h2) x
(s1, s2) (h1, h2)
(s3, s4) (h2, h1)
5 s1 s4 s2 s3 (s1, s2) (h3, h4) x
(s1, s2) (h4, h3) x
(s3, s4) (h4, h3) x
(s3, s4) (h4, h1)
6 s1 s4 s3 s2 (s1, s2) (h3, h4) x
(s1, s2) (h4, h3) x
(s1, s2) (h1, h3)
7 s2 s1 s3 s4 (s1, s2) (h3, h1) x
(s1, s2) (h1, h3) x
(s3, s4) (h3, h2)
(s3, s4) (h3, h1)
8 s2 s1 s4 s3 (s1, s2) (h4, h1) x
(s1, s2) (h1, h4) x
9 s2 s3 s1 s4 (s3, s4) (h2, h1) x
(s3, s4) (h2, h3)
10 s2 s3 s4 s1 (s3, s4) (h2, h1) x
11 s2 s4 s1 s3 (s3, s4) (h4, h3) x
(s3, s4) (h4, h1)
12 s2 s4 s3 s1 (s1, s2) (h3, h1) x
13 s3 s1 s2 s4 (s1, s2) (h3, h1) x
(s1, s2) (h1, h3) x
(s1, s2) (h2, h1)
(s3, s4) (h1, h2)
(s3, s4) (h1, h3)
Table 8: Example 3.8 / Table 3, matchings 1-13 not weakly stable
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Hospitals Blocking coalitions
no. h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals Undominated?
14 s3 s1 s4 s2 (s1, s2) (h4, h1) x
(s1, s2) (h1, h4) x
(s1, s2) (h2, h1)
(s3, s4) (h1, h2)
15 s3 s2 s1 s4 (s1, s2) (h3, h1) x
(s3, s4) (h1, h2)
(s3, s4) (h1, h3)
16 s3 s2 s4 s1 (s1, s2) (h4, h1) x
(s3, s4) (h1, h2)
17 s3 s4 s1 s2 (s1, s2) (h3, h1) x
18 s3 s4 s2 s1 (s1, s2) (h3, h1) x
(s1, s2) (h4, h1)
19 s4 s1 s2 s3 (s1, s2) (h3, h4) x
(s1, s2) (h4, h3) x
(s3, s4) (h4, h3) x
20 s4 s1 s3 s2 (s1, s2) (h3, h4) x
(s1, s2) (h4, h3) x
(s1, s2) (h2, h3)
(s3, s4) (h3, h2)
21 s4 s2 s1 s3 (s3, s4) (h4, h3) x
22 s4 s2 s3 s1 (s1, s2) (h3, h2) x
(s3, s4) (h3, h2) x
23 s4 s3 s1 s2 (s1, s2) (h3, h2) x
24 s4 s3 s2 s1 (s1, s2) (h3, h2) x
(s1, s2) (h4, h2)
Table 9: Example 3.8 / Table 3, matchings 14-24 not weakly stable
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Students A blocking coalition
no. s1 s2 s3 s4 Students Hospitals
1 h1 u h2 h3 (s1, s2) (h2, h4)
2 h1 u h2 h4 (s1, s2) (h2, h3)
3 h1 u h3 h2 (s1, s2) (h2, h4)
4 h1 u h3 h4 (s1, s2) (h3, h2)
5 h1 u h4 h2 (s1, s2) (h2, h3)
6 h1 u h4 h3 (s1, s2) (h3, h2)
7 h2 h3 h1 u (s3, s4) (h3, h4)
8 h2 h4 h1 u (s3, s4) (h4, h3)
9 h3 h2 h1 u (s3, s4) (h2, h4)
10 h3 h4 h1 u (s3, s4) (h4, h2)
11 h4 h2 h1 u (s3, s4) (h2, h3)
12 h4 h3 h1 u (s3, s4) (h3, h2)
Table 10: Example 3.9 / Table 4, no stable matchings
Blocking coalitions
no. Students Hospitals Dominated by no.
1 (s1, s2) (h3, h2) 9
2 (s1, s2) (h4, h2) 1
3 (s1, s2) (h1, u) 2
4 (s1, s2) (h2, u) 3
5 (s1, s2) (h3, u) 4
6 (s1, s2) (h4, u) 5
7 (s3, s4) (h2, h3) 5
8 (s3, s4) (h3, h2) 5
9 (s3, s4) (h4, h2) 8
Table 11: Example 3.9 / Table 4, a weakly stable matching: µ(S) = u, h1, h4, h3
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Hospitals Blocking coalitions?
no. h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals
1 ∅ s2 s4 s3 (s3, s4) (h4, h1)
2 ∅ s3 s4 s2 (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
3 ∅ s1 s4 s3 (s3, s4) (h4, h1)
4 s3 s1 s2 ∅ (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
5 s3 s1 s4 s2 (s3, s4) (h2, h3)
6 s3 s2 s1 ∅ (s3, s4) (h1, h3)
7 s3 s2 s4 ∅ (s1, s2) (u, h3)
8 s3 ∅ s1 s2 (s1, s2) (h3, h2)
9 s4 s1 s2 s3 (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
10 s4 s1 ∅ s2 (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
11 s4 s2 s1 s3 −− −−
12 s4 s3 s1 s2 (s1, s2) (h3, h2)
13 s4 s3 s2 ∅ −− −−
Table 12: Example 4.4 / Table 5, 13 matchings (with a blocking coalition when possible)
Hospitals Blocking coalitions?
no. h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals
1 ∅ s2 s4 s3 (s3, s4) (h1, h3)
2 ∅ s3 s4 s2 (s1, s2) (u, h3)
3 ∅ s1 s4 s3 (s1, s2) (h2, h3)
4 s3 s1 s2 ∅ (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
5 s3 s1 s4 s2 (s1, s2) (h2, h3)
6 s3 s2 s1 ∅ (s3, s4) (h1, h3)
7 s3 s2 s4 ∅ (s1, s2) (u, h3)
8 s3 ∅ s1 s2 (s1, s2) (h3, h2)
9 s4 s1 s2 s3 (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
10 s4 s1 ∅ s2 (s1, s2) (h3, h2)
11 s4 s2 s1 s3 (s3, s4) (h4, h3)
12 s4 s3 s1 s2 (s1, s2) (h3, h2)
13 s4 s3 s2 ∅ −− −−
Table 13: Theorem 4.5 / Manipulation by c2, 13 matchings (a blocking coalition when possible)
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Hospitals Blocking coalitions?
no. h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals
1 ∅ s2 s4 s3 (s3, s4) (h4, h1)
2 s3 s2 s1 ∅ (s3, s4) (h4, h1)
3 s3 s2 s4 ∅ (s3, s4) (h4, h1)
4 s4 s3 s1 ∅ (s1, s2) (h3, h2)
5 ∅ s3 s4 ∅ (s1, s2) (u, h2)
6 s4 s2 s1 s3 −− −−
Table 14: Theorem 4.5 / Manipulation by c1, 6 matchings (a blocking coalition when possible)
Hospitals Blocking coalitions?
no. h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals
1 ∅ s1 s4 s3 (s1, s2) (h2, h3)
2 ∅ s2 s4 s3 (s1, s2) (u, h3)
3 ∅ s3 s4 s2 (s1, s2) (u, h3)
4 s3 s1 s2 ∅ (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
5 s3 s1 s4 s2 (s1, s2) (h2, h3)
6 s3 s2 s4 ∅ (s1, s2) (u, h3)
7 s4 s1 ∅ s2 (s1, s2) (h2, h3)
8 s4 s1 s2 ∅ (s3, s4) (h2, h1)
9 s4 s2 ∅ s3 (s1, s2) (u, h3)
10 s4 s3 ∅ s2 (s1, s2) (u, h3)
11 s4 s3 s2 ∅ −− −−
Table 15: Comment after Theorem 4.5 / Manipulation by h3, 11 matchings (a blocking coalition
when possible)
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Some things couples always wanted to know
about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)∗
Bettina Klaus† Flip Klijn‡ Jordi Masso´§
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Abstract: In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm
in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of
couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peran-
son, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable
matching, even when couples’ preferences are ‘responsive,’ i.e., when Gale and Shapley’s (1962)
deferred acceptance algorithm (on which the old NRMP algorithm is based) is applicable. Sec-
ond, we demonstrate that the new NRMP algorithm may also be manipulated by couples acting
as singles.
Keywords: Matching; Stability; Couples
JEL classification: C78; D78; J41
1 Introduction
In many countries, the proportion of women attending college has steadily been increasing during
the last decades. Thus, it is not surprising that the number of couples searching jointly for a job in
the same labor market has been increasing as well. In this paper we deal with a specific US labor
market that, because of its history and development, is a bench mark for several other matching
markets in the US and Canada. Each year thousands of medical school graduates seek their first
employment through a centralized matching process, the National Resident Matching Program
(NRMP).1 This clearinghouse was initiated in the 1950’s in response to persistent failures to
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1See Roth (1984), Roth and Sotomayor (1990), and Roth and Peranson (1999).
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organize the market in a timely and orderly way by decentralized means. Roth (1984) would
later explain its success by showing that the clearinghouse in fact employed the hospital-optimal
variant of the so-called deferred acceptance algorithm, developed by Gale and Shapley (1962)
who at the time were not aware of the relation with the NRMP.
Around the mid 1970’s voluntary and orderly participation in the NRMP started to drop.
What happened then was that a growing number of couples in need of two positions in the
same vicinity left the centralized market and started to negotiate directly with hospitals (see
Checker, 1973). As a consequence, the labor market became, just as before the 1950’s, prone to
chaos and dissatisfaction on all sides. A hypothesis offered by Roth (1984) is that the chaotic
conditions reflect the instability of the matching procedure. If couples and hospitals find it
profitable to make their own arrangements outside of the matching program it must be that
the matching procedure is unstable with respect to couples. This indeed turned out to be the
case. In the mid 1990’s a crisis of confidence2 in the matching procedure on the applicants side
finally induced the NRMP Board of Directors to design a new algorithm. Apart from recovering
students’ confidence by favoring their side, the algorithm was also meant to deal with couples
in an appropriate manner.3 The first match with the new algorithm was carried out in 1998.
Roth and Peranson (1999) describe how the new algorithm was designed. Furthermore, using
computational simulations and analyzing previous data, they show that the new algorithm is to
be expected to perform well in practice. Roth (2002) gives a more recent review of the redesign
of the NRMP algorithm in the context of analyzing the ‘engineering aspects’ of economic design.
A nice overview of how the new algorithm was designed to address the problems that occur in
the presence of couples is given in Roth (2002, Section 2.4.1).
In this note, we address two issues that are of importance for couples that participate in the
new NRMP algorithm. The first issue concerns the stability of the matching obtained by the
NRMP algorithm. A matching is ‘stable’ if (a) each couple and each hospital have acceptable
matches, and (b) no couple and no pair of hospitals prefer a mutual match to the ones that have
been assigned. Roth (1984) and Sotomayor (unpublished note) independently demonstrate the
possibility of instability in the presence of couples. However, Klaus and Klijn (2004) show that
for a natural preference domain for couples, namely the domain of ‘responsive’ preferences, there
is always a stable matching that moreover can be found by applying Gale and Shapley’s (1962)
deferred acceptance algorithm. In Example 3.1 we construct a matching market in which couples
have responsive preferences and where there is a unique stable matching, which hence can be
easily obtained by Gale and Shapley’s (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm. Surprisingly, we
still find that the new NRMP algorithm may cycle, that is, not find the stable matching.
Next, couples may wonder if they should apply to the NRMP as a couple or as two seemingly
independent applicants. With our second couples market (Example 3.2) we show that the new
NRMP algorithm may indeed be prone to strategic manipulation by the members of a couple
pretending to be singles, i.e., a couple may be better off by applying as two separate applicants.
Both our couples markets are realistic in the sense that (a) couples’ preferences can be easily
explained in terms of individual preferences and distances between hospitals, and (b) hospitals
have the same preferences over students (which can be justified by final grades or test scores).
2Many students believed that the matching was not conducted in their best interest and that possibilities for
strategic manipulations existed; see Roth and Peranson (1999).
3In fact, three other issues that are not relevant in the present discussion were addressed as well. See Roth (2002,
p. 1355) for details.
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2 Matching with couples: the model
We describe a model with 4 hospitals and 2 pairs of students; H = {h1, h2, h3, h4}, S =
{s1, s2, s3, s4}, and C = {c1, c2} = {(s1, s2), (s3, s4)} are the sets of hospitals, students, and
couples, respectively. Each hospital has exactly one position to be filled. Our definitions and
results can easily be adapted to more general situations that include other couples as well as
single agents and hospitals with multiple positions.
Hospitals’ preferences: Each hospital h ∈ H has a strict, transitive, and complete preference
relation h over the set of students S and the prospect of having its position unfilled, denoted
by ∅; for instance, P (h) = s4, s2, ∅, s1, s3 indicates that hospital h prefers student s4 to s2, and
considers students s1 and s3 to be unacceptable. Let PH = {P (h)}h∈H .
Students’ preferences: Similarly, each student s ∈ S has an individual strict, transitive, and
complete preference relation s over the set of hospitals and the prospect of being unemployed,
denoted by u. We assume that these individual preferences are the preferences a student has if
he is single. For instance, P (s) = h1, h2, h3, h4, u indicates that student s prefers hi to hi+1 for
i = 1, 2, 3 and prefers being employed to being unemployed. Let PS = {P (s)}s∈S .
Couples’ preferences: Each couple c ∈ C has a strict, transitive, and complete preference
relation c over all possible combination of ordered pairs of (different) hospitals and the prospect
of being unemployed. We denote a generic ordered pair of hospitals by (hp, hq), where hp and hq
indicate either a hospital or being unemployed. For instance, P (c) = (h4, h2), (h3, h4), (h4, u),
etc., indicates that couple c = (s1, s2) prefers s1 and s2 being matched to h4 and h2, respectively,
to being matched to h3 and h4, respectively, and so on. Let PC = {P (c)}c∈C .
Singles and couples markets: Now, the standard one-to-one two-sided matching market with
single students, or singles market for short, is denoted by (PH , PS). Since singles markets and
some of the classical results for singles markets are well-known, for a detailed description we
refer to Roth and Sotomayor (1990). We define a one-to-one matching market with couples, or
a couples market for short, by (PH , PC).
Matchings: A matching µ for a couples market (PH , PC) is an assignment of students and
hospitals such that each student is assigned to at most one hospital in H or to u (which can
be assigned to multiple students), each hospital in H is assigned to at most one student or to
∅ (which can be assigned to multiple hospitals), and a student is assigned to a hospital if and
only if the hospital is assigned to the student. A matching µ is completely described by the list
µ(H) = µ(h1), µ(h2), µ(h3), µ(h4) of students in S or ∅ matched to hospitals h1, h2, h3, h4.
Stability: Finally, we define stability for couples markets (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).
First, for a matching to be stable, it should always be better for students (one or both members
in a couple) to accept the position(s) offered by the matching instead of voluntarily choosing
unemployment and for hospitals it should always be better to accept the student assigned by
the matching instead of leaving the position unfilled. A matching µ is individually rational if
(i1) for all c = (sk, sl), (µ(sk), µ(sl))c(µ(sk), u), (µ(sk), µ(sl))c(u, µ(sl)),
and (µ(sk), µ(sl))c(u, u);
(i2) for all h ∈ H, µ(h)h∅.
Second, if one partner in a couple can improve the given matching for the couple by switching to
another hospital such that this hospital is better off as well, then we would expect this mutually
beneficial trade to be carried out, rendering the given matching unstable. A similar statement
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holds if both students in the couple can improve. For a given matching µ, (c = (sk, sl), (hp, hq))
is a blocking coalition if
(b1) (hp, hq)c(µ(sk), µ(sl));
(b2) [hp ∈ H implies skhp µ(hp)] and [hq ∈ H implies slhq µ(hq)].
A matching is stable if it is individually rational and if there are no blocking coalitions.4
Roth (1984) and Sotomayor (unpublished note) demonstrate that stable matchings may not
exist in the presence of couples. Klaus and Klijn (2004) prove existence for couples market where
couples’ preferences are ‘responsive’ by applying Gale and Shapley’s (1962) deferred acceptance
algorithm to the ‘associated individual preferences.’ A couple’s preferences are responsive if the
unilateral improvement of one partner’s job is considered beneficial for the couple as well. For
instance, responsive preferences may reflect situations where couples search for jobs in the same
metropolitan area (if one partner switches to a job he/she prefers and the couple can still live
together, then the couple is better off).5
Responsive preferences: Couple c = (sk, sl) has responsive preferences if there exist associated
individual preferences sk and sl such that for all hp, hq, hr ∈ H ∪ {u}, [hpskhr implies
(hp, hq)c(hr, hq)] and [hpslhr implies (hq, hp)c(hq, hr)]. If these preferences sk and sl
exist, then they are unique.
3 Couples and the new NRMP algorithm
The formal and complete description of the new algorithm used by the NRMP is outside the scope
of this note. Essentially, the new algorithm adapts (from the original one-to-one model without
couples) Roth and Vande Vate’s (1990) dynamic process to find stable matchings. Flowchart 1 in
the Appendix describes concisely the parts of the new Applicant Proposing Couples Algorithm
(APCA) used by the NRMP that are relevant for applying the algorithm to Examples 3.1 and
3.2 below. (The complete flowchart describing the APCA algorithm that we used to derive
Flowchart 1 was kindly made available to us by Alvin Roth.6)
First, we demonstrate that even for responsive preferences the algorithm might cycle without
selecting a stable matching. This example is particularly interesting because the unique stable
matching could be easily found using the deferred acceptance algorithm.
Example 3.1 The New NRMP Algorithm may cycle for Responsive Preferences
Consider the couples market (PH , PC) given in Table 1. Students’ individual preferences PS
equal P (s1) = P (s2) = h1, h2, h3, h4, u, P (s3) = h2, h1, h3, h4, u, and P (s4) = h3, h4, h2, h1, u.
Note that the couples’ preferences are responsive: any unilateral improvement of one partner’s
job is considered beneficial for the couple as well. Moreover, hospitals have identical preferences
over students, which can be easily justified if hospitals rank students according to final grades or
other test scores. The unique stable matching for (PH , PC) is µ(H) = s2, s3, s1, s4 (Appendix,
Table 2), which, because of responsiveness, is the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm.
4In order to keep notation as simple as possible, we allow some redundancy in the definition of stability with
respect to (i1) and (b1).
5For a discussion of results related to responsiveness in couples markets we refer to Klaus and Klijn (2004).
6We contacted the NRMP and asked them to ‘run’ the algorithm with our examples below. Since the NRMP
is involved in an antitrust lawsuit they were advised by their legal counsel not to accommodate our request.
4
Next, we apply the Applicant Proposing Couples Algorithm to this couples market. Suppose
that couple (s3, s4) is at the top of the stack (a symmetric process occurs if instead couple (s1, s2)
is at the top of the stack). The algorithm starts with the empty matching µ0 (H) = ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅
and cycles over the unstable matchings µI (H) = ∅, s3, s4, ∅, µII (H) = s1, s2, ∅, ∅, µIII (H) =
s3, ∅, s4, ∅, µIV (H) = s2, s1, ∅, ∅, and finally back to µI (H). 
PH PC
h1 h2 h3 h4 s1s2 s3s4
s2 s2 s2 s2 h1h2 h2h3
s3 s3 s3 s3 h1h3 h2h4
s1 s1 s1 s1 h1h4 h2h1
s4 s4 s4 s4 h2h1 h1h3
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ h2h3 h1h4
h2h4 h1h2
h3h1 h3h4
h3h2 h3h2
h3h4 h3h1
h4h1 h4h3
h4h2 h4h2
h4h3 h4h1
...
...
Table 1: Responsive preferences for which the new NRMP algorithm cycles
Finally, we illustrate the possibility that, if the APCA is used, a couple may obtain a better
pair of positions by registering as single students rather than as a couple.
Example 3.2 Pretending to be Single may be Beneficial
Consider the couples market (PH , PC) where hospitals h1 and h2 are located in one city and
hospitals h3 and h4 in some other, distant city. Students and couples have the same pref-
erences over hospitals: P (s) = h1, h2, h3, h4, u for each s ∈ S and P (s1,s2) = P (s3, s4) =
(h1, h2) , (h2, h1) , (h3, h4) , (h4, h3) , . . . (the tail can be anything). In other words, a couple would
look for two positions in another market before accepting two positions located in different cities.
The hospitals’ preferences over students are P (h) = s1, s3, s4, s2, ∅ for every h ∈ H.
Assume first that the four students register as couples, and couple (s1, s2) is at the top of
the stack. Then, the APCA yields the matching µ˜(H) = s1, s2, s3, s4.
However, if s3 and s4 register as single students and, as a consequence, the order in the stack
changes to s3, s4, (s1, s2), then the algorithm yields the matching µˆ(H) = s3, s4, s1, s2. At this
matching couple (s3, s4) is strictly better off than at matching µ˜.7 
7If instead the order in the stack changes to s4, s3, (s1, s2), then the algorithm produces the matching µ¯(H) =
s4, s3, s1, s2, in which couple (s3, s4) is also strictly better off than at matching µ˜.
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4 Appendix
Hospitals Blocking coalitions?
no. h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals
1 s1 s2 s3 s4 (s3, s4) (h1, h4)
2 s1 s2 s4 s3 (s3, s4) (h1, h3)
3 s1 s3 s2 s4 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
4 s1 s3 s4 s2 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
5 s1 s4 s2 s3 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
6 s1 s4 s3 s2 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
7 s2 s1 s3 s4 (s3, s4) (h2, h4)
8 s2 s1 s4 s3 (s3, s4) (h2, h3)
9 s2 s3 s1 s4 −− −−
10 s2 s3 s4 s1 (s1, s2) (h3, h1)
11 s2 s4 s1 s3 (s1, s2) (h2, h1)
12 s2 s4 s3 s1 (s1, s2) (h2, h1)
13 s3 s1 s2 s4 (s3, s4) (h2, h4)
14 s3 s1 s4 s2 (s1, s2) (h2, h1)
15 s3 s2 s1 s4 (s1, s2) (h3, h1)
16 s3 s2 s4 s1 (s1, s2) (h3, h1)
17 s3 s4 s1 s2 (s1, s2) (h2, h1)
18 s3 s4 s2 s1 (s1, s2) (h2, h1)
19 s4 s1 s2 s3 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
20 s4 s1 s3 s2 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
21 s4 s2 s1 s3 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
22 s4 s2 s3 s1 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
23 s4 s3 s1 s2 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
24 s4 s3 s2 s1 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
Table 2: Example 3.1, all individually rational matchings (with blocking coalition when possible)
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 0.0  Initialization: Stack contains all applicants (couples at bottom); Initial 
matching: µ=∅ (all positions unfilled, all applicants unmatched). 
1.t  Any applicants in stack? 
8.t  Check the stability of the matching 
at which each h i  is matched to the 
applicant it is holding. Stable? 
No 
2.t  Select the individual applicant or couple (a=a i  or a=(a i ,a j )) 
at the top of the applicant stack (and remove from stack): set n=1. 
Yes 
3.t-1.q  Applicant’s preference list 
has at least n entries preferred to µ? 
3.t-2.q  Applicant applies to nth choice on 
preference list (if applicant is a couple, this may 
involve an application to two distinct hospitals). 
Yes 
3.t-3.q  Does (each) hospital (h=h i or h=(h i ,h j )) applied to either have a vacancy, or 
have no vacancy but prefer applicant to least preferred other application currently held?  
n=n+1 
q=q+1 
No 
Stop. Current 
matching is 
final matching. 
Yes 
4.t  Does (either) hospital need to reject previously held 
applicant to make room for holding new applicant? 
Yes 
(Hospital now “holds” new applicant) No 
µ=µ∪(h,a) 
[(h,a)={h i ,a i } or {(h i ,a i ),(h j ,a j )}] 
5.t  Put rejected applicant(s) a’ at the top of the stack. 
Yes 
6.t  Is a rejected applicant a i  a member of a couple (a i ,a k ) AND 
is a k ’s application currently being held by some hospital h k ? 
No 
µ=µ∪(h,a)/(h,a’) 
7.t  Withdraw a k ’s application from h k  (making 
h k ’s position vacant). 
Yes 
Loop detector here: same couple 
displaced by same applicant? 
µ=µ∪(h,a)/{(h i ,a i ),(h k ,a k )} 
No 
Flowchart 1: The analyzed part of the Applicant Proposing Couples Algorithm (APCA) 
t=1
t=t+1
q=1 
No 
···
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The APCA applied to Example 3.1:
0.0 µ0 (H) = ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅.
1.1 Yes.
2.1 (s3, s4) is selected and set n = 1.
3.1-1.1 Yes, (s3, s4) has more than one entry preferred to µ0 (s3, s4) = (u, u).
3.1-2.1 (s3, s4) applies to (h2, h3).
3.1-3.1 Yes, h2 “holds” s3 and h3 “holds” s4.
4.1 No, no rejection is needed; µI (H) = ∅, s3, s4, ∅.
1.2 Yes.
2.2 (s1, s2) is selected and set n = 1.
3.2-1.1 Yes, (s1, s2) has more than one entry preferred to µI (s1, s2) = (u, u).
3.2-2.1 (s1, s2) applies to (h1, h2).
3.2-3.1 Yes, h1 “holds” s1 and h2 “holds” s2.
4.2 Yes, h2 rejects s3; µII (H) = s1, s2, ∅, ∅.
5.2 (s3, s4) is at the top of the stack.
6.2 s3 is rejected and s4 is currently being held by h3.
7.2 s4 is withdrawn from h3; µII (H) = s1, s2, ∅, ∅.
1.3 Yes.
2.3 (s3, s4) is selected and set n = 1.
3.3-1.1 Yes, (s3, s4) has more than one entry preferred to µII (s3, s4) = (u, u).
3.3-2.1 (s3, s4) applies to (h2, h3).
3.3-3.1 No, h2 prefers s2 to s3. Set n = 2.
3.3-1.2 Yes, (s3, s4) has more than two entries preferred to µII (s3, s4) = (u, u).
3.3-2.2 (s3, s4) applies to (h2, h4).
3.3-3.2 No, h2 prefers s2 to s3. Set n = 3.
3.3-1.3 Yes, (s3, s4) has more than three entries preferred to µII (s3, s4) = (u, u).
3.3-2.3 (s3, s4) applies to (h2, h1).
3.3-3.3 No, h2 prefers s2 to s3 and h1 prefers s1 to s4. Set n = 4.
3.3-1.4 Yes, (s3, s4) has more than four entries preferred to µII (s3, s4) = (u, u).
3.3-2.4 (s3, s4) applies to (h1, h3).
3.3-3.4 Yes, h3 has a vacancy and h1 prefers s3 to s1.
4.3 Yes, h1 rejects s1; µ4.3 (H) = s3, s2, s4, ∅.
5.3 (s1, s2) is at the top of the stack.
6.3 s1 is rejected and s2 is currently being held by h2.
7.3 s2 is withdrawn from h2; µIII (H) = s3, ∅, s4, ∅.
1.4 Yes.
2.4 (s1, s2) is selected and set n = 1.
3.4-1-1 Yes, (s1, s2) has more than one entry preferred to µIII (s1, s2) = (u, u).
3.4-2.1 (s1, s2) applies to (h1, h2).
3.4-3.1 No, h1 prefers s3 to s1. Set n = 2.
3.4-1.2 Yes, (s1, s2) has more than two entries preferred to µIII (s1, s2) = (u, u).
3.4-2.2 (s1, s2) applies to (h1, h3).
3.4-3.2 No, h1 prefers s3 to s1. Set n = 3.
3.4-1.3 Yes, (s1, s2) has more than three entries preferred to µIII (s1, s2) = (u, u).
3.4-2.3 (s1, s2) applies to (h1, h4).
3.4-3.3 No, h1 prefers s3 to s1. Set n = 4.
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3.4-1.4 Yes, (s1, s2) has more than four entries preferred to µIII (s1, s2) = (u, u).
3.4-2.4 (s1, s2) applies to (h2, h1).
3.4-3.4 Yes, h2 has a vacancy and h1 prefers s2 to s3.
4.4 Yes, h1 rejects s3; µ4.4 (H) = s2, s1, s4, ∅.
5.4 (s3, s4) is at the top of the stack.
6.4 s3 is rejected and s4 is currently being held by h3.
7.4 s4 is withdrawn from h3; µIV (H) = s2, s1, ∅, ∅.
1.5 Yes.
2.5 (s3, s4) is selected and set n = 1.
3.5-1.1 Yes, (s3, s4) has more than one entry preferred to µIV (s3, s4) = (u, u).
3.5-2.1 (s3, s4) applies to (h2, h3).
3.5-3.1 Yes, h3 has a vacancy and h2 prefers s3 to s1.
4.5 Yes, h2 rejects s1; µ4.5 (H) = s2, s3, s4, ∅.
5.5 (s1, s2) is at the top of the stack.
6.5 s1 is rejected and s2 is currently being held by h1.
7.5 s1 is withdrawn from h2; µV (H) = µI (H) = ∅, s3, s4, ∅.
The APCA cycles and stops at one of the unstable matchings µI , µII , µIII , µIV , or µV .
The APCA applied to Example 3.2 with (s1, s2) , (s3, s4) in the stack:
0.0 µ0 (H) = ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅.
1.1 Yes.
2.1 (s1, s2) is selected and set n = 1.
3.1-1.1 Yes, (s1, s2) has more than one entry preferred to µ0 (s1, s2) = (u, u).
3.1-2.1 (s1, s2) applies to (h1, h2).
3.1-3.1 Yes, h1 “holds” s1 and h2 “holds” s2.
4.1 No, no rejection is needed; µI (H) = s1, s2, ∅, ∅.
1.2 Yes.
2.2 (s3, s4) is selected and set n = 1.
3.2-1.1 Yes, (s3, s4) has more than one entry preferred to µI (s3, s4) = (u, u).
3.2-2.1 (s3, s4) applies to (h1, h2).
3.2-3.1 No, h1 prefers s1 to s3. Set n = 2.
3.2-1.2 Yes, (s3, s4) has more than two entries preferred to µI (s3, s4) = (u, u).
3.2-2.2 (s3, s4) applies to (h2, h1).
3.2-3.2 No, h1 prefers s1 to s4. Set n = 3.
3.2-1.3 Yes, (s3, s4) has more than three entries preferred to µI (s3, s4) = (u, u).
3.2-2.3 (s3, s4) applies to (h3, h4).
3.2-3.3 Yes, h3 “holds” s3 and h4 “holds” s4.
4.2 No, no rejection is needed; µII (H) = s1, s2, s3, s4.
1.3 No, the stack is empty.
8.3 Yes, µ˜(H) ≡ µII (H) = s1, s2, s3, s4 is stable and it is the outcome of the algorithm.
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The APCA applied to Example 3.2 with s3, s4, (s1, s2) in the stack:
0.0 µ0 (H) = ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅.
1.1 Yes.
2.1 s3 is selected and set n = 1.
3.1-1.1 Yes, s3 has more than one entry preferred to µ0 (s3) = u.
3.1-2.1 s3 applies to h1.
3.1-3.1 Yes, h1 “holds” s3.
4.1 No, no rejection is needed; µI (H) = s3, ∅, ∅, ∅.
1.2 Yes.
2.2 s4 is selected and set n = 1.
3.2-1.1 Yes, s4 has more than one entry preferred to µI (s4) = u.
3.2-2.1 s4 applies to h1.
3.2-3.1 No, h1 prefers s3 to s4. Set n = 2.
3.2-1.2 Yes, s4 has more than two entries preferred to µI (s4) = u.
3.2-2.2 s4 applies to h2.
3.2-3.2 Yes, h2 “holds” s4.
4.2 No, no rejection is needed; µII (H) = s3, s4, ∅, ∅.
1.3 Yes.
2.3 (s1, s2) is selected and set n = 1.
3.3-1.1 Yes, (s1, s2) has more than one entry preferred to µII (s1, s2) = (u, u).
3.3-2.1 (s1, s2) applies to (h1, h2).
3.3-3.1 No, h2 prefers s4 to s2. Set n = 2.
3.3-1.2 Yes, (s1, s2) has more than two entries preferred to µII (s1, s2) = (u, u).
3.3-2.2 (s1, s2) applies to (h2, h1).
3.3-3.2 No, h1 prefers s3 to s2. Set n = 3.
3.3-1.3 Yes, (s1, s2) has more than three entries preferred to µII (s1, s2) = (u, u).
3.3-2.3 (s1, s2) applies to (h3, h4).
3.3-3.3 Yes, h3 “holds” s1 and h4 “holds” s2.
4.3 No, no rejection is needed; µIII (H) = s3, s4, s1, s2.
1.4 No, the stack is empty.
8.4 Yes, µˆ(H) ≡ µIII (H) = s3, s4, s1, s2 is stable and it is the outcome of the algorithm.
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